Australia and New Zealand have agreed in principle to the creation of a single agency for the regulation of pharmaceuticals and other therapeutic products in a trans-Tasman market. The
US pharmaceutical industry was targeting, as the scientific cost-effectiveness evaluations performed by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee ("PBAC"). Picking up on these obligations, Annex 2C of the AUSFTA also included provisions requiring Australia's Therapeutic Goods Administration to initiate discussions with the US Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") about making "innovative" products more speedily available (Annex 2C.4).
Chapter 17 of the AUSFTA (Intellectual Property) additionally contained a provision (article 17.10.4) requiring the Australian TGA to "prevent" marketing approval for a generic medicine whenever a patent (of any type) was "claimed" over the original product. Concerns about the resultant amendments to the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) facilitating "evergreening" of soon to expire patents, lead to the passing of specific anti-evergreening legislation by the Australian parliament. 6 This article explores the question of whether the proposed joint scheme between Australia and New Zealand for the regulation of therapeutic products could inherit such AUSFTA obligations arising from Annex 2C and Chapter 17. It then considers how these might impact on the regulation of safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness for medicines and medical devices (including blood products) in New Zealand.
The Trans-Tasman Regulatory Agency
Australia and New Zealand have agreed in principle to the creation of a single agency for the regulation of pharmaceuticals and other therapeutic products to administering a trans-Tasman market. The Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Authority ("ANZTPA") is being developed to replace the Australian TGA and the NZ Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority (Medsafe). 12 In broad terms its regulatory activities will include: 1) pre-marketing evaluation and assessment 2) product licensing 3) controls on manufacture 4) post-market monitoring and surveillance and 5) setting standards.
One curious feature of the documentation surrounding the establishment of this agency, is a lack of substantial discussion whether obligations imposed on the Australia's TGA under the AUSFTA will be taken up entirely by the ANZTPA. In its submission to the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Medicines Australia (a lobby organisation for brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers located in Australia) noted the differences in intellectual property protection between New Zealand and Australia and submitted any resultant ambiguities should not be resolved in favour of the "weaker" New Zealand laws.
Medicines Australia went further, suggesting that various measures should be included in the treaty to ensure Australia's stronger intellectual property provisions apply. 13 Concerns about precisely this possibility were expressed by the New Zealand Pharmaceutical Management
Agency ("Pharmac") and re-iterated by New Zealand's Health Committee in its report on the ANZTPA:
"Pharmac noted a number of concerns about the joint agency proposal, including possible increases in the cost of generic drugs, particularly for small market products, and possible increases in patent terms of medicines. In its written submission to us, Pharmac noted that unless rules were very carefully drafted, the cost of these latter increases as a flow-on effect of the free trade agreement between Australia and the United States of America could amount to between $85 and $135 million over 3 years."
1) "Linkage" Obligations and Evergreening
The first area of concern involves the question of whether the "evergreening" notification provisions in article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA will apply to the ANZTPA, as they do now to the TGA due to implementing changes to the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth).
Article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA is the now notorious "evergreening" provision. Under article 17.10.4 (a) "marketing approval" by Australia's TGA of a generic drug must be "prevented" when any type of patent is "claimed" by a brand-name manufacturer that has not body with specialist patent and public health expertise, has been closely scrutinising the inhibition by this mechanism, of rapid entry of cheap generic medicines to the market.
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Classic "Hatch-Waxman" evergreening, as imposed on Canada after NAFTA, involves a brand name pharmaceutical company gaining regulatory notification of impending generic entry and then seeking an injunction to gain extra patent life and royalties, usually in relation to a "blockbuster" high sales volume drug. 20 There are, however, now many other techniques of "evergreening". 21 One approach is to cluster multiple, even hundreds of, patents around each molecule covering not only its active compound, but also its uses and delivery systems. In time this strategy may extend to patenting combinations of drugs (aspirin with statins), or for linking each drug prescription to a genetic test.
Another technique involves licensing agreements between the brand name owners of a soon-to-expire pharmaceutical "blockbuster" patent and generic companies (creating a socalled "authorized" generic) and, increasingly, take-overs of generic companies by brand name manufacturers. 22 The brand name pharmaceutical industry also extends its patent monopolies by driving out generic competition, for example by lobbying governments to implement mandatory price reductions by generics that reduce their profit margins.
The ANZTPA will be established by Australia as a body corporate under Australian legislation to administer the joint scheme in both countries. 23 Under the joint scheme there will only be one application for marketing approval and one licence necessary for both Australia and New Zealand. The obvious question is whether the ANZTPA will become a vehicle whereby New Zealand will be subjected to the AUSFTA article 17.10.4
"evergreening" linkage requirements currently impose on Australia's TGA.
Medicines Australia appears to have contemplated just such an outcome. In its submission to the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Inquiry into the ANZTPA, Medicines Australia expressed concern that: "The dual country licence may also exacerbate patent infringements that some of our members have experienced with products protected by patent being supplied by a generic company in contravention of the Patents Act."
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To combat this, Medicines Australia proposed the ANZTPA administer a measure similar to that outlined in article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA where the patent holder was notified by ANZTPA regulators when they received an application to register a generic product. In response, the Australian Government stated that: "We are focusing our attention on the regulatory aspects of the quality, safety and efficacy of therapeutic products rather than on the patent aspects, but we think that some of the measures that we will have in place that will deal with the safety issues in particular will meet some of the needs and concerns of Medicines Australia. Ministers for Health) may make rules for the purposes of prescribing 'notification requirements' in respect of the manufacture, supply, import, export or promotion of therapeutic products. 26 While no rules have been made to date, the potential clearly exists for the "evergreening" notification provisions under the AUSFTA to also apply to the ANZTPA.
This possibility was recognised in New Zealand even before the AUSFTA was finalised:
access to cheap, generic medicines in New Zealand… is further exacerbated by the proposed free trade deal between Australia and the United States of America, which contains provisions that are designed to add further restrictions on the approval of generic medicines by the joint agency. These restrictions will make it more difficult for generic medicines to make it to the market, pushing up costs for Pharmac and hence the New Zealand taxpayer and reducing access to new medicines."
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It is possible (but operationally difficult) to specify that the measures required by article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA could be "carved out" to operate only with respect to Australia under the ANZTPA. Most likely, however, New Zealand may well be subjected to these "evergreening" obligations by default under the ANZTPA and generic manufacturers in both countries will be required to notify patent holders upon application for approval to market a generic product in either Australia or New Zealand.
Delayed entry of generic drugs as result of the brand name pharmaceutical patent "evergreening" strategies facilitated by articles such as 17.10.4, could have a significant impact on the viability of a nation's generic pharmaceutical industry. The cost, for example, to the PBS and Australian taxpayers of an "evergreening"-induced 24 month delay to generic competition after brand name patent expiry over certain key classes of "blockbuster" There is an AUSFTA supervising committee (and possibly the Medicines Working Group) overseeing implementation of the "evergreening" notification provisions of 17.10.4.
Its recommendations may mean that in time this obligation will apply not only to pharmaceuticals, but also to over-the-counter and complementary medicines. Previously, New Zealand has not required pre-market approval for complementary medicines (often termed dietary supplements in New Zealand and regulated under food legislation). Under the Joint Regulatory Scheme, however, these products will be regulated by the ANZTPA. This has been one of the most controversial aspects of the Scheme in New Zealand. The absence of an existing system for the regulation of complementary medicines in New Zealand will make it difficult for New Zealand to resist the blanket introduction of the current Australian arrangements for these products, including the "evergreening" notification provisions.
A related question will be whether the Australian "anti-evergreening" legislation introduced with the AUSFTA implementing legislation will also apply to the ANZTPA and to New Zealand. This legislation introduced a new ss 26C and 26D in the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth). The "anti-evergreening" amendments allow the Commonwealth AttorneyGeneral to join an application for an injunction by a brand name patent holder against a generic medicines manufacturer and to claim damages where the injunction has caused a price rise under the PBS. While it is unlikely that any generic company will use these provisions to litigate due to financial constraints and cross-ownership in the industry, the existence of the New Zealand introduced similar legislation at the time it entered the ANZTPA it is unclear whether it could take advantage of these Australian "anti-evergreening" amendments.
The US has clearly signalled its disapproval of the Australian "anti-evergreening" amendments stating their belief that the amendments "impose a potentially significant, unjustifiable and discriminatory burden on the enjoyment of patent rights". 30 However, in challenging the amendments on the basis that they are discriminatory as to the field of technology and thus a breach of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS, the US is on weak ground.
Immediately prior to finalising the AUSFTA negotiations, the US legislature passed its involves the use of tendering for low cost generic medicines. 33 In determining whether a product should be listed, Pharmac must consider the health needs of people within New Zealand, the existing alternative medicines available, the clinical benefits and risks of pharmaceuticals, the cost-effectiveness of using pharmaceuticals, the budgetary impacts of listing a certain product and the direct cost to the health service user. In determining the subsidy at which a product is listed, Pharmac may use any one of a number of pricing Recent speculation that Pharmac tendering-style arrangements would be introduced in Australia in order to contain the cost of the PBS met with strong criticism from the pharmaceutical industry in both New Zealand and Australia. 35 Pharmac is likely to be such a target simply because of its success. It was established with the objective of securing the best health outcomes reasonably achievable from pharmaceutical treatment and within the funding provided by the government.
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Between 1998 and 2002, the average annual change in pharmaceutical expenditure in New Zealand was 1.4%, compared to 14.5% in the US, 9.7%
in the UK and 12.1% for Australia.
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Supporting this possibility is the fact that AUSFTA Annex 2C(1)(c) emphasises "timely and affordable access to innovative pharmaceuticals" through "transparent, expeditious, and accountable procedures." This suggests an explicit link between Annex 2C(1)(c) ("timely and affordable access to innovative pharmaceuticals") and Annex 2C (4) (dialogue on "making innovative medical products more quickly available").
Alternatively, however, Annex 2C(4) also opens the door for the US FDA, should it so wish, to commence discussions with ANZTPA representatives on introducing a new system for recognizing pharmaceutical innovation that links "innovation" to community cost effectiveness in comparison with existing alternate drug therapies. This scenario could arise from ANZTPA incorporating for the purposes of Annex 2C(4), the unusual definition of "innovation" specified in Annex 2C(1).
Annex 2C (1) Inserting a corporate-defined conception of "innovation" as a major policy driver into the ANZTPA and perhaps into Pharmac would undoubtedly compromise policy principles
that have been more thoroughly tested by democratic processes, such as "equity" and "social justice.
However there is some evidence that "innovation" has been set in Annex 2C(1) of the AUSFTA in a context which emphasises objective proof of the social value of innovation.
Annex 2C(1)(a), for example, links "innovation" with "high quality health care." Annex 2C(1)(c) sets pharmaceutical innovation within the context of "affordability" and "accountability" and Annex 2C(1)(d) creates a commitment by the parties that recognition of innovative pharmaceuticals may involve either "competitive markets" (hence the necessity for collusion and other anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry to be policed by regulators) or "procedures that appropriately value the objectively demonstrated therapeutic significance" of a pharmaceutical (the scientific approach to cost-effectiveness evaluation prior to government reimbursement).
While brand-name pharmaceutical industry rhetoric frequently links its new "innovative" products with improved public health, there is very little, if any, research that establishes that link. 42 Much genuine innovation in medicines development continues to arise from public funded university R&D expenditure and be supported by specific government programs.
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Tax concessions have also been important stimulators of pharmaceutical innovation. 45 However, because they minimise costs of pharmaceuticals for taxpayers in Australia and New Zealand, cost-effectiveness and reference pricing mechanisms are constantly lobbied against by brand-name pharmaceutical multinationals. The US government was recently prohibited by pharmaceutical company-sponsored legislation from using its bulk buying power to bargain down drug costs. 46 PhRMA, throughout the AUSFTA negotiations, frequently criticised reference pricing and cost-effectiveness aspects of the PBS as a "trade distorting, abusive, or discriminatory price control". 47 Their numerous lobbyists convinced the US Government to believe and argue, without substantial supportive research being adduced, that a viable strategy medicines policy in the US and Australia would ensure consumers in all countries, not just the US, paid for the high research and development (R&D) costs required to make "innovative" pharmaceuticals.
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A major problem here is that the members of PhRMA have yet to disclose the marginal cost of production for each allegedly "innovative" drug. 49 Further, reliable evidence now suggests that US pharmaceutical companies spend 2-3 times more on marketing, administration and lobbying than on R&D, and their profits are approximately twice such costs. 50 The Australian Productivity Commission has confirmed that the largest price differences between Australia and the US are for aggressively marketed non-innovative "me- 
3) Direct to Consumer Advertising
The third problem for the ANZTPA is that the preferred pharmaceutical industry model of reduced scientific evaluation of cost-effectiveness and increased direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) may be facilitated. AUSFTA Annex 2C(5) permits a pharmaceutical manufacturer to disseminate pharmaceutical information via the internet, for example, via links on sites frequently used by Australian patients. This appears to be a PhRMA strategy to begin the process of lobbying for direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in Australia. DTCA is legal in the USA and New Zealand, but not in Australia. It has been associated with a substantial increase in usage of the products which are often not in accord with clinical bestpractice. 53 The problem is that including Annex 2C(5) in the ANZTPA could effectively entrench DTCA in the New Zealand system, even if a subsequent New Zealand government became convinced that evidence showed it was harming public health or public expenditure on pharmaceuticals.
In the US, pharmaceuticals can be marketed directly to the consumer, provided they have been shown to be safe and effective in animal and human studies when compared with a placebo (effectively nothing). Industry can increase revenue simply by increasing advertising to doctors and direct to patients. Zealand and permit DTCA of prescription medicines.
4) Cost-Recovery and Independence
The fifth problem, though one chiefly exacerbating the lobbying effects mentioned earlier, involves considerations of whether the ANZTPA will seek full cost recovery from industry. While the Australian Government is to provide funding for the establishment and implementation of the joint scheme and New Zealand is to contribute to the financial requirements of the ANZTPA, the Australian and New Zealand Governments anticipate the ANZTPA will operate on a full cost recovery basis within 5 years. 56 The problems faced by the US FDA in the Vioxx scandal 57 reveal how difficult it may become for the ANZTPA to operate as an effective regulator if it is not actually and perceived to be at full arms' length from industry pressure.
In addition, full cost recovery may increase the cost of gaining regulatory approval for therapeutic products with the effect of raising barriers to entry to the market. Pharmac 
5) The TRIPS-Plus IP Ratchet
Chapter 17 of the AUSFTA includes a variety of provisions apparently designed to protect the interests of US pharmaceutical multinationals in ways which go further than the TRIPS agreement. This has led these provisions to be characterised as "TRIPS-PLUS" although in terms of their impact on social welfare and public health "TRIPS-MINUS" would probably be a more apt descriptor. Australia may decide to "share the pain" and expose regional neighbours to similar provisions in its bilaterals. The US is also highly likely to seek to include similar provisions in other bilaterals it enters into in Australasia. Such provisions could also become part of the US attempt to ratchet up global intellectual property protection via multiple bilateral and regional trade agreements and ultimately a renegotiation of TRIPS. First, if CSL Ltd is no longer processing Australia's plasma, it may no longer be able to provide a cost-effective service to New Zealand, forcing New Zealand to send its plasma further afield. Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong may be similarly affected. Second, New
Zealand may also be required to open its own processing arrangements to tender, or will be under added pressure to do so in their own trade negotiations with the US.
The NZBS is concerned primarily with the potential cost increases arising from the joint authority of changes to standards:
The advent of the Trans-Tasman Joint Regulatory Agency … has the capacity to significantly influence the framework and standards under which NZBS operates [6, p.2] NZBS expect a significant increase in their costs of compliance with the new ANZTPA, and reduced interaction between NZBS and the regulating authority, compared with what they currently enjoy with MedSafe.[6, p.25] They are concern ed that regulations will be imposed rather than developed through an interactive process between the blood service and the new regulator. [6, p.26] However, there are several other areas that they should be concerned about as they may potentially be adversely affected under AUSFTA. In the same report, the NZBS states its commitment to several aspects of their service provision:
Ensuring that a continuous supply of safe blood products and services is available to all New
Zealanders at all times (p.6)
That donors expect that "The gift status of blood and blood products will be preserved" (p.7).
That patients and consumers expect that "Blood and blood products will be free of any charge other than recovery of NZBS processing and testing costs" (p.7).
The first undertaking could be threatened by offshore manufacture of blood products. A key role of the NZBS is to maintain the national supply chain of blood and blood products. This capacity will be diminished should the tender for plasma fractionation services in Australia be opened, reducing ability to ensure rapid delivery to areas in need. Distance, reduced potential for continued quality assurance and loss of the chain of supply means that blood products may not be available when required, their safety may be reduced and their origins more difficult to trace. In there were to be a significant disaster where large quantities of blood and derived products are required, there will be increased delay in supply to New Zealand.
The altruism expressed in the second NZBS commitment is compromised as blood becomes further commercialised, and sold on for profit, and it may be difficult to reconcile the third with blood going overseas for processing and being resold as a value added product specifically to create profit for commercial companies.
Some limited products (e.g. clotting agents) are imported by Australia and New Zealand, but only when significant clinical superiority to local products has been demonstrated. In the exchange of letters, however, Australia agreed to set aside requirements of demonstrated clinical improvement in imported products, [7] opening the door to more, potentially less safe products.
Blood products imported from the US are potentially less safe than those manufactured from donors in Australia and New Zealand because 'donors' in the US are often paid (up to US$200 per month legitimately,[10] or more if they attend different collection centres and donate more often than recommended). Blood that is bought is more likely to carry infection than that from altruistic donation. [1] [2] [3] [4] Futhermore, there is a growing global trade in blood where products are manufactured in the more developed countries from blood that has been sourced from the poor in developing countries, [11] effectively "laundered" in the process so the original source may be impossible to trace. The setting aside under AUSFTA of the clinical improvement requirement potentially reduces New Zealand's capacity to ensure safety in its blood products.
The value of safe blood from Australia and New Zealand may be such that a special market is created overseas. Blood and plasma may be exported for processing, and then perhaps only a proportion of it bought back while some finds its way into the veins of those who can afford it. **Tom -did you want to say more about this?**
The advent of the ANZTPA could potentially lead to Australia and New Zealand being treated as a single, larger source of blood and plasma and a single market in buying back blood products, with no differentiation between the two. If the high standards of each country are maintained, this may not be a safety issue, although it could become a political one if one countries donations were perceived to be shoring up the blood supply of the other.
With the ANZTPA, New Zealand may find itself tied to Australia's obligations under the AUSFTA, and become a an unwitting participant in the global blood trade.
7) Medical Devices Issues
Regulatory Co-Operation The Parties shall seek to advance the existing dialogue between the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration and the US Food and Drug Administration with a view to making innovative medical products more quickly available to their nationals. [emphasis added] Sponsors of medical devices who are legally supplying those products in Australia or New Zealand prior to commencement of the joint scheme will qualify for a transitional approval to be known as an interim product licence. This licence will authorise the continued supply of the medical device, in the jurisdiction in which it was previously being lawfully supplied, for the duration of a defined transition period. Any manufacturer who holds a valid manufacturing licence issued by Medsafe or the TGA prior to commencement of the Agency will be issued an interim manufacturing licence. Transitional arrangements will be required to give sponsors and manufacturers of prescription and OTC medicines in Australia and New Zealand time to achieve compliance with regulatory requirements under the joint scheme. These arrangements will be based on the principles set out in the Treaty. Certain applications will have been approved by the TGA or Medsafe, however similar applications for approval (1) is unclear. However, regardless of the correct interpretation of the scope of topics to be discussed by the Working Group, it appears that when the Group met for the first time in January this year, "innovation" issues were on the agenda.
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The Medicines Working Group is not authorised under the AUSFTA to discuss any aspect of the PBS, whether legislative in nature or otherwise that is not mentioned in Annex 2C. It, for example, cannot explore elements of the cost-effectiveness system established by judicial decisions, such as the "leakage" of official to unauthorised usage. 101 Similarly, it
should not be able to discuss comparison of the product proposed for marketing approval against non-pharmaceutical alternatives. 102 The Annex 2C (1) 
Conclusion
One of the main impacts of the AUSFTA on medicines policy in Australia, New Zealand and their region, it has been argued here, will be increased lobbying designed to remove the structures of cost-effectiveness pricing. Reference pricing, for example, is an aspect of scientific cost-effectiveness evaluation of medicines that has been alleged by PhRMA and its
Australian mouthpiece Medicines Australia, with the backing of the US Trade Representative and Department of Commerce, in the context of AUSFTA innovation obligations, to constitute a non tariff barrier to full market access for its innovative products. Numerous "innovative" products are alleged to be in the production pipeline and to be capable of delivering vast improvements in healthcare outcomes. The research supporting such claims is thin and dubious and it is never suggested that policy changes be automatically reversed if the promised beneficial outcomes never eventuate. Coupled with such claims is the ideologic stance that Australasian consumers ("patients" to those yet giving normative weight to the traditional ethical and human rights norms of the profession) are "free riding" on US research
and development.
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What should be kept in mind by governments evaluating industry lobbying based on such claims is that at most 25% of the budgets of PhRMA's members allegedly goes to R&D and only a portion of this is dedicated to discovering "breakthrough" drugs. Most is spent on making minor ("me-too") variations to existing, profitable "developed-nation-disease" medicines. The pharmaceutical industry spends much more on marketing and advertising.
Further, the costs of producing an "innovative" medicine are unknown. Industry does not reveal marginal cost of production and only periodically reveals such data to "in-house" pharmaco-economists who appear to inflate the costs for lobbying purposes. Pharmaceutical company profits, after R&D costs have been removed, are conservatively estimated to be three to four times the profits of other US companies. The parties' primary and initial commitment in Annex 2C to "continued improvements in public health for their nationals" appears to have implicitly acknowledged the presence in the AUSFTA of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. This states, in part, "trade agreements should be interpreted and implemented to protect public health and promote universal access to medicines". 135 There are two reasons for this. First, the AUSFTA explicitly refers in Chapter 17 to the TRIPS convention. 136 The Parties' reference to "public health" in Annex 2C can therefore be presumed to have also included the most recent One policy suggestion for the preservation of pharmaceutical cost-effectiveness regimes is to include these systems in bilateral and regional trade agreements. The relevant provision (which could be particularly pertinent to trade deal discussions with China which has the world's largest generic pharmaceutical market) would be to establish a Medicines Cost-Effectiveness Committee. A draft provision might be included after a discussion of quality and safety issues. It might read along these lines:
"Medicines Cost-Effectiveness Committee
The Parties hereby establish a Medicines Cost-Effectiveness Committee, comprising relevant federal government officials and expert advisors, whose objective shall be to promote discussion and mutual understanding with a view to enhancing and developing techniques of and research related to cost-effectiveness pricing of pharmaceuticals."
No objection could be made that such a provision in any way breached TRIPS obligations as it is not related to intellectual property.
Another policy suggestion is for medical schools to begin incorporating in the curricula, particularly in areas related to teaching evidence-based medicine, the techniques of cost-effectiveness pricing, including reference pricing as utilised by the PBAC process and tendering as implemented by Pharmac. This would ensure that the present accumulated wisdom of expert assessors flows on and is enhanced in the next generation.
The most important point to make here, however, is that Australia appears to have gained significant trade concessions in agriculture and manufacturing by conceding to US pharmaceutical industry demands to include innovation principles (Annex 2C), the "evergreening" notification process (article 17.10.4) and the prohibition on parallel importation in article (17.9.4) in the AUSFTA. It makes little economic sense for New
Zealand to give these bargaining chips away via the ANZTPA, particularly when the possibility of a trade deal with the US still exists.
